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Abstract
Douglas Walton’s multitudinous contributions to the study of argumen-
tation seldom, if ever, directly engage with argumentation in mathematics.
Nonetheless, several of the innovations with which he is most closely associated
lend themselves to improving our understanding of mathematical arguments. I
concentrate on two such innovations: dialogue types (§1) and argumentation
schemes (§2). I argue that both devices are much more applicable to mathe-
matical reasoning than may be commonly supposed.
1 Dialogue Types
Several decades ago, Douglas Walton proposed a classification of dialogue types:
di erent contexts in which argumentation may arise [67, 68]. His elegant presen-
tation of the key di erences between the most central types (from joint work with
Erik C. W. Krabbe) is summarized in Table 1. Dialogue types are distinguished by
two main factors: the initial situation or circumstances in which the interlocutors
find themselves and their main goal in pursuing a dialogue. Some situations admit
more goals than others: if the situation is strongly adversarial, the disputants may
be seeking a full determination of the matter at hand, requiring one to persuade the
other; or they may need to decide on a course of action and negotiate a practical
consensus; or they may have little intent beyond airing their respective positions,
however quarrelsome or eristic the exchange. Whereas, if the interlocutors are ad-
dressing an open problem where neither has any prior commitments, the last of these
goals would be incoherent, but the disputants may still inquire into the problem or
deliberate on how best to act. And if the interaction arises simply because one party
has knowledge the other lacks, only the first sort of outcome makes any sense: an
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decision (not) to act Negotiation Deliberation N/A
Reaching a (provisional)
accommodation Eristic N/A N/A
Table 1: Walton and Krabbe’s systematic survey of dialogue types [73, p. 80]
information-seeking dialogue. Thus we arrive at six principal dialogue types. How-
ever, some of these types may be further subdivided or combined [72, p. 31], and
the classification is not intended to be exhaustive.
Walton itemizes the goals of the interlocutors, individual or collective, and the
potential benefits that may accrue from dialogues of each of the main types in
Table 2 (taken from [71, p. 605]; see also [68, p. 413], [73, p. 66]). Di erent patterns
of argument may be appropriate in di erent dialogue types: what is reasonable in
a negotiation would be improper in a persuasion dialogue; almost anything goes in
a quarrel but well-conducted inquiries require respect for procedure, and so forth.
Another important feature of the picture that Walton and Krabbe present is the
dialectical shift: in the course of a dialogue its type may change [73, pp. 100  .].
This can be a positive development—as a conversation unfolds, its participants can
productively shift their attention to di erent ends. But dialectical shifts can also
be troublesome, especially if they go unnoticed by one or more of the participants,
leading to the use of argumentative tactics that are now contextually inappropriate.
Walton does not discuss mathematical dialogues but, in other work, his collab-
orator Krabbe observes that proofs may occur in several di erent contexts:
1. thinking up a proof to convince oneself of the truth of some theorem;
2. thinking up a proof in dialogue with other people (inquiry dia-
logue. . . );
3. presenting a proof to one’s fellow discussants in an inquiry dialogue
(persuasion dialogue embedded in inquiry dialogue. . . );

















































































Table 2: Walton’s types of dialogue [71, p. 605]
in a journal (persuasion dialogue. . . );
5. presenting a proof when teaching (information-seeking and persua-
sion dialogue) [44, p. 457].
The primary, if not exclusive, concern of Krabbe’s account (and of my own earlier
application of dialogue types to mathematics [2]) is with proof. This may reflect what
has been called in another context “proof chauvinism”—a tendency in philosophers
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of mathematics to privilege proof over other aspects of mathematical practice [19].
Nonetheless, proof is the aspect of mathematical practice where the applicability of
informal logic is most unexpected. Hence I shall again begin with proofs.
Are proofs always dialogues or can they be monologues? The conception of the
mathematician as isolated genius has a firm grip on the popular imagination [37].
It is true that mathematicians coauthor papers less than most other scientists, and
there are some celebrated examples of solitary endeavour, such as Srinavasa Ra-
manujan labouring in obscurity or Andrew Wiles’s years of solo work prior to his
surprise announcement of a proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem. Nonetheless, this im-
pression is incomplete at best: Ramanujan only began to fulfil his potential after
travelling to Cambridge to collaborate with Hardy and Littlewood [42]; Wiles dis-
covered gaps in his solo work which were eventually bridged by a collaboration with
Richard Taylor [53]. On the other hand, as Paul Ernest suggests, there are many
ways in which mathematics is underpinned by “symbolically mediated exchanges
between persons”—conversations or dialogues:
First, the ancient origins as well as various modern systems of proof
use dialectical or dialogical reasoning, involving the persuasion of oth-
ers [see also [23].] . . . Second, mathematics is a symbolic activity using
written inscriptions and language; it inevitably addresses a reader, real
or imagined, so mathematical knowledge representations are conversa-
tional. Third, many mathematical concepts [such as epsilon-delta defi-
nitions of limit in analysis and hypothesis testing in statistics] have an
internal conversational structure. Fourth, the epistemological founda-
tions of mathematical knowledge, including the nature and mechanisms
of mathematical knowledge genesis and warranting, utilise the deploy-
ment of conversation in an explicitly and constitutively dialectical way.
Fifth, . . . mathematical facts stand on the basis of collective agreement
and are part of institutional reality . . . built on interpersonal commu-
nicative interactions, that is, through conversation [25, p. 74].
Once we agree that mathematical proof is dialogical, we may ask in what dialogue
type it characteristically arises. As Krabbe indicates, the proving process, at least
at its inception, might best be thought of as an inquiry dialogue: a collaborative
exchange between mathematicians with the shared goal of settling an open question,
which neither of them has prejudged. Certainly such exchanges can be found in
mathematics, at least in the context of discovery of mathematical results (see, for
example, [66]). However, there is also an unavoidable element of adversariality in
the epistemology of mathematical proof: mathematicians only trust proofs that have
gained wide assent from the mathematical audience [14]; the value of that assent
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lies in the assumption that the proofs have been su ciently challenged. Catarina
Dutilh Novaes has sought to capture this idea in terms of prover/sceptic dialogues
[21, 22, 23]. Prover and sceptic are (idealizations of) two complementary roles in
the process that leads to the eventual acceptance of a proof by the mathematical
public: the prover presents a putative proof; the sceptic responds with searching
but fair questions; through their successive exchanges the proof is improved where
necessary and eventually comes to be generally accepted (or is exposed as unsound).
Prover/sceptic dialogues are persuasion dialogues because the parties start from a
di erence of opinion, as required by their contrasting roles.
Journal referees can play the sceptic role, at least if they are su ciently thorough
in their scrutiny [10]. But so can collaborators, at an earlier stage in the develop-
ment of a proof, or other mathematicians, at a later stage, who expand or refine the
published proof in their own work. Imre Lakatos’s celebrated imaginative recon-
struction of the development of a proof of the Descartes–Euler conjecture (linking
the numbers of vertices, edges, and faces of polyhedra) takes the form of a dialogue
between characters loosely representing various nineteenth-century mathematicians
[47]. Lakatos identifies a range of dialectical manoeuvres whereby mathematicians
either present apparent counterexamples of various kinds to a working conjecture
or respond to such apparent counterexamples. (Alison Pease and colleagues have
shown how these Lakatosian manoeuvres can be captured in terms of dialogue games
[55].)
But perhaps the dialogue type in which proofs are most frequently presented
is neither inquiry nor persuasion, but pedagogical information-seeking. Proofs are
presented in countless classrooms at school and university level and even research
mathematicians will attend essentially didactic presentations of novel but settled re-
sults. Such exchanges are best understood as information-seeking dialogues. Hence,
as Krabbe notes, the development of a proof may be seen as a sequence of dialectical
shifts, from an initial inquiry phase, to a more verification-focussed persuasion di-
alogue, and eventually, if the proof survives these earlier stages, to a dissemination
phase characterized by information-seeking dialogues. Of course, the progress of
most significant proofs is seldom this smooth, so the dialectical shifts are likely to
be more numerous, as failed attempts at verification send mathematicians back to
more open-ended inquiry, or at least open up subsidiary discussions of how localized
problems may be addressed. Michael Barany and Donald MacKenzie, in an ethno-
graphic treatment of mathematical research, describe how some of these processes
can work:
When a suitable partial result is obtained and researchers are confident in
the theoretical soundness of their work, they transition to “writing up”.
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Only then do most of the formalisms associated with o cial mathemat-
ics emerge, often with frustrating di culty. Every researcher interviewed
had stories about conclusions that either had come apart in the attempt
to formalize them or had been found in error even after the paper had
been drafted, submitted, or accepted. Most saw writing-up as a pro-
cess of verification as much as of presentation, even though they viewed
the mathematical e ort of writing-up as predominantly “technical”, and
thus implicitly not an obstacle to the result’s ultimate correctness or
insightfulness [15, pp. 111 f.].
Although inquiry, persuasion, and information-seeking dialogues are perhaps the
dialogue types most hospitable to proof, they do not exhaust the range of dialogue
types in which mathematical argumentation may occur. By analogy with the device
used to indicate problematic sporting records, I have elsewhere used “proof*” to re-
fer to “species of alleged ‘proof’, where there is either no consensus that the method
provides proof, or there is broad consensus that it doesn’t, but a vocal minority or
an historical precedent which points the other way” [3, p. 2]. Amongst the proofs*
I included “proofs* predating modern standards of rigour, picture proofs*, proba-
bilistic proofs*, computer-assisted proofs*, textbook proofs* which are didactically
useful but would not satisfy an expert practitioner, and proofs* from neighbouring
disciplines with di erent standards”. Each of these cases can be seen two ways: ei-
ther as a (perhaps very) disputed form of mathematical proof or as an undisputed
form of mathematical reasoning that ought to be characterized as something other
than proof. Hence, if our goal is to repudiate proof chauvinism and characterize
mathematical reasoning in general, then we must pay attention to proofs*.
Table 3, adapted from [2, p. 148], summarizes the principal mathematical di-
alogue types discussed so far: inquiry, persuasion, and pedagogical information-
seeking. It also lists three dialogue types in which proof* is likely to be more at home
than proof: deliberation, negotiation, and a non-pedagogical form of information-
seeking. Deliberation and negotiation abandon the goal of stable resolution that
we would normally expect of proof whereas oracular information-seeking pursues
that goal in an unconventional manner. In one of his foundational papers on com-
putability, Alan Turing briefly considers the case of a machine “supplied with some
unspecified means of solving number-theoretic problems; a kind of oracle as it were”
[64, p. 172]. Subsequent authors expanded this remark into a theory of relative com-
putability [60]. There is nothing necessarily supernatural about an oracle machine:
a laptop with access to an online database would meet the broad definition (if we
ignore Turing’s statement that the oracle “cannot be a machine” [64, p. 173]). How-






































































Table 3: Some mathematical dialogue types
the local machine; in principle, they could be inscrutable to any analysis. Sceptics
of the proof status of unsurveyably large computer-assisted proofs, such as Thomas
Tymoczko, have suggested that the appeal such proofs make to a computer should
be seen in similar terms [65]. Analogously, Yehuda Rav proposes as a thought exper-
iment a computer that could answer any mathematical question with certainty but
without proof. For Rav, such a machine would be “a death blow to mathematics, for
we would cease having ideas and candidates for conjectures” [57, p. 6]. Tymoczko
and Rav are both concerned about fallacious appeal to authority in mathematical
proof, an issue I will return to below.
The combinatorialist Edward Swart was also concerned with “lengthy proofs
(whether achieved by hand or on a computer)”. He coined the term “agnograms”
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to refer to the resulting “theoremlike statements” since we are, at least for the im-
mediate future, required to be agnostic about their truth value, as they “have been
neither adequately formalized nor adequately surveyed and are suggestive rather
than definitive”, due to the limitations of our available resources [62, p. 705]. Estab-
lishing an agnogram is thus more of a practical settlement than a stable resolution,
suggesting that the dialogue in which it results may better be seen as delibera-
tion or even negotiation, rather than inquiry or persuasion. Likewise, in a widely
discussed polemical proposal, Arthur Ja e and Frank Quinn sought a clear demar-
cation between “speculative and intuitive work” in “theoretical mathematics” and a
“proof-oriented phase” of “rigorous mathematics” [41, p. 2]. Of course, speculative
and intuitive work is characteristic of the earlier, inquiry phase of a proof dialogue.
However, Ja e and Quinn anticipate an outlet for responsibly labelled speculation;
since this is provisional in character, the process by which it is derived might be seen
as deliberation. Something similar might also be said about conjectures, particularly
the wide-ranging, fruitful conjectures that comprise the framework of mathemati-
cal research programmes, sometimes called “architectural conjectures” [49, p. 198].
Even more speculative is the suggestion of Doron Zeilberger that in the not so distant
future “semi-rigorous mathematics” may essentially assign price tickets to proofs,
indicating the quantity of computational resources needed for certainty, thereby sit-
uating mathematical proof within a negotiation dialogue [78]. This proposal has
not generally been well received [12]. Nonetheless, in a weaker form it reflects a
truism: even the purest of mathematicians cannot ignore issues of funding, even if
the link to their work is not as intimate as Zeilberger suggests. Lastly, even eristic
dialogues have had some role to play in mathematical reasoning, as witnessed by
such celebrated quarrels as that between the early modern mathematicians Girolamo
Cardano and Niccolò Tartaglia [59]. The salient detail is not the asperity of their
exchange, which ultimately turned on an accusation of theft of intellectual prop-
erty, but the adversarial strategy mathematicians of that era adopted to convince
the mathematical public of their successes. Rival mathematicians would keep their
methods (in this case of solving cubic equations) secret but challenge each other
to public contests, each solving problems set by the other until the winner posed a
problem the loser could not solve.
2 Argumentation Schemes
An argumentation scheme is a stereotypical pattern of reasoning. In recent decades,
the study and classification of argumentation schemes has been the most influential
aspect of Douglas Walton’s work [70, 75]. Although antecedents of the argumenta-
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tion scheme can be traced back millennia to the tradition of loci or topoi, Walton’s
work set it on a new foundation of rigour and clarity. Building on that foundation,
Hans Hansen has proposed the following definition of argumentation scheme: “(i) a
pattern of argument, (ii) made of a sequence of sentential forms with variables, of
which (iii) at least one of the sentential forms contains a use of a schematic constant
or a use of a schematic quantifier, and (iv) the last sentential form is introduced by
a conclusion indicator like ‘so’ or ‘therefore’ ” [32, p. 349]. Schemes also generally
include ‘critical questions’, which itemize possible lines of response. The critical
questions are key to the evaluation of defeasible schemes: whether the argument
should be judged to have succeeded or whether it has been defeated will turn on
whether the questions can receive a satisfactory answer.
Walton argues that in principle all defeasible argumentation schemes could be
understood as special cases of a defeasible version of modus ponens [75, p. 366]:
Argumentation Scheme 1 (Defeasible Modus Ponens)
Data: P .
Warrant: As a rule, if P , then Q.
Therefore, . . .
Qualifier: presumably, . . .
Claim: . . . Q.
Critical Questions:
1. Backing: What reason is there to accept that, as a rule, if P , then Q?
2. Rebuttal: Is the present case an exception to the rule that if P , then Q?
I have reconstructed Walton’s scheme for defeasible modus ponens so as to bring
out its resemblance to another very general model of defeasible reasoning, the Toul-
min layout [7, p. 829]. (On the relationship of schemes to layouts, see also [54,
pp. 22  .]; for a contrasting view, see [38].) This is not an accidental choice: Toul-
min layouts have lately found widespread employment in the analysis of mathemat-
ical argumentation (for recent surveys, see [43, 46]). Although Walton emphasized
defeasible schemes, deductive rules of inference can also be seen as argumentation
schemes: the schemes framework is “illatively neutral” [32, p. 355]. This means that
argumentation schemes can provide a unified treatment of a wide range of arguments
employed in mathematics. Indeed, a number of authors have applied argumentation
schemes to mathematical reasoning [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 20, 50, 51, 54].
The illative neutrality of the schemes framework licences scepticism about the
“standard view” [13] of mathematical argumentation as purely comprised of deriva-
tions, that is arguments in which every step instantiates a deductive inference rule.
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To that end, I have elsewhere proposed a threefold distinction between A-, B-, and
C-schemes:
• A-schemes correspond directly to derivation rules. (Equivalently,
we could think in terms of a single A-scheme, the ‘pointing scheme’
which picks out a derivation whose premisses and conclusion are
formal counterparts of its data and claim.)
• B-schemes are exclusively mathematical arguments: high-level al-
gorithms or macros. Their instantiations correspond to substruc-
tures of derivations rather than individual derivations (and they
may appeal to additional formally verified propositions).
• C-schemes are even looser in their relationship to derivations, since
the link between their data and claim need not be deductive. Spe-
cific instantiations may still correspond to derivations, but there
will be no guarantee that this is so and no procedure that will al-
ways yield the required structure even when it exists. Thus, where
the qualifier of A- and B-schemes will always indicate deductive
certainty, the qualifiers of C-schemes may exhibit more diversity.
Indeed, di erent instantiations of the same scheme may have di er-
ent qualifiers ([7, p. 829]; cf. [6, pp. 366 f.]).
So the widespread “standard” view of mathematical proof, that it is identical to
derivation, could be expressed as denying C-schemes a place in proofs. I have argued
against that view [6, p. 375], but even if it were to be conceded, it would still leave
room for C-schemes in other forms of mathematical reasoning.
What sort of schemes might C-schemes be? Some of them may be unique to
mathematics, but we should expect others to resemble schemes that have been
found useful in addressing non-mathematical reasoning. Walton and his collabo-
rators have made a number of attempts to classify such general purpose argumenta-
tion schemes. Table 4 is based on a recent classification he developed with Fabrizio
Macagno. Walton and Macagno employ a series of binary distinctions: first between
source-dependent arguments and source-independent arguments; then subdividing
the latter into practical reasoning and epistemic reasoning; which is in turn divided
into discovery arguments and arguments applying rules to cases. Each of the four
resulting headings are then further subdivided into various thematic groups of in-
dividual schemes. However, Walton and Macagno concede that this classification is
incomplete, notably omitting some linguistic arguments [74, p. 24].
I have annotated Table 4 with citations to works in which mathematical versions





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































identified under each of Walton and Macagno’s four main headings. In addition,
mathematical applications have been found for several schemes that are missing
from Table 4 but which are found in the more exhaustive (but less structured) list
in [75]. These include linguistic arguments, such as arguments from arbitrariness
or vagueness of a verbal classification [54] and argument from definition to verbal
classification [5], but also source-dependent arguments, such as ethotic argument
[5], practical reasoning arguments, such as argument from positive consequences [5],
discovery arguments, such as abductive argument [54] and argument from evidence
to a hypothesis [5, 7, 54], and arguments applying rules to cases, such as argument
from an exceptional case [54]. Conversely, not all of the individual schemes in Table 4
have yet been found useful in discussing mathematics. While some of these omissions
may merely be oversights, others are to be expected. For example, causal reasoning,
whether argument from cause to e ect or the various kinds of slippery slope, is
unlikely to be of direct application to mathematics, since mathematical objects are
generally understood to be causally inert. In the remainder of this section, I will
discuss the mathematical applications of a sample of schemes, chosen in part to
remedy some of the omissions in Table 4.
2.1 Epistemic reasoning
Walton and Macagno subdivide epistemic reasoning into two subcategories, discov-
ery arguments and arguments applying rules to cases. Arguments of both kinds can
be readily found in mathematical reasoning. In particular, many discovery argu-
ments are broadly abductive in character and abduction has been proposed as an
account of mathematical reasoning in a wide range of situations, including class-
room discussion [29, 52]; concept formation in mathematical practice [35]; and the
selection and defence of axioms [36]. There are several abductive schemes in Wal-
ton’s catalogue, including multiple subtypes of abductive argument [75, p. 329] and
argument from evidence to (verification of) a hypothesis, which I have discussed
elsewhere [5, 7, 54]. Another such scheme is argument from sign:
Argumentation Scheme 2 (Argument from Sign [75, p. 329])
Specific Premise: A (a finding) is true in this situation.
General Premise: B is generally indicated as true when its sign, A, is true.
Conclusion: B is true in this situation.
Critical Questions:
1. What is the strength of the correlation of the sign with the event signified?
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2. Are there other events that would more reliably account for the sign?
Argument from sign has been discussed since antiquity, particularly in the con-
text of medical reasoning [9]. The explicit application of Scheme 2 to mathematics
is due to Ian Dove, who uses it to analyse a surprising but widely discussed class
of proofs*: those employing molecular computation [20]. This consists in encoding
a mathematical problem into strands of DNA which are then subject to standard
laboratory assays that determine the solution of the problem with high likelihood
[8]. Hence the outcome of the assay is a sign of the mathematical problem having a
specific solution, and the mathematician infers the latter from the former in accor-
dance with Scheme 2. This, and other less esoteric probabilistic methods, such as the
Miller–Rabin primality test, are generally viewed by mathematicians as heuristically
useful but falling short of the standards of rigour required for proof. Nonetheless,
the intellectual defensibility of this perspective has also been the subject of a debate
in philosophy of mathematics [24, 26, 28]. Much of this debate could be understood
as o ering competing answers to the critical questions for Scheme 2. Dove also sug-
gests that what I have referred to above as oracular information seeking could be
analysed as employing the same scheme [20, p. 144].
Argument from sign also illustrates the importance of the illative neutrality
of argumentation schemes: not all its instances need be defeasible. We can find
deductive instances of Scheme 2. For example, much of twentieth and twenty-first
century mathematics employs increasingly complex mathematical infrastructure or
tools: that is, mathematical theories designed to help us investigate other areas
of mathematics. Mathematical tools, such as Galois theory or K -theory, establish
rigorous relationships between outwardly unrelated classes of mathematical objects.
As Jean-Pierre Marquis observes, the function of such tools is to “reveal important
properties of the objects studied, and only these properties” [48, p. 264]. In other
words, a result in one of the two related areas may be taken as a sign that one of
the presumably less tractable objects in the other area has a particular property.
However, since the relationship between the areas can be rigorously established, the
sign is not merely generally indicative, but infallibly so.
Applying rules to cases is also a very widespread practice in mathematics. Several
of the schemes that fall under this heading, such as argument from verbal classi-
fication, argument from example, and argument from analogy, have mathematical
applications that I have discussed elsewhere [4, 5, 6]. Walton and Macagno also in-
clude chained arguments, which comprise a substantial proportion of mathematical
reasoning [5, p. 235]. But here I shall focus on a di erent scheme:
Argumentation Scheme 3 (Argument from an Established Rule [75, p. 343])
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Major Premise: If carrying out types of actions including A is the established rule
for x, then (unless the case is an exception), x must carry out A.
Minor Premise: Carrying out types of actions including A is the established rule for
a.
Conclusion: Therefore, a must carry out A.
Critical Questions:
1. Does the rule require carrying out types of actions that include A as an in-
stance?
2. Are there other established rules that might conflict with or override this one?
3. Is this case an exceptional one, that is, could there be extenuating circum-
stances or an excuse for noncompliance?
Scheme 3 is framed in terms of actions to be carried out. That might initially
appear to be an obstacle to its application to mathematics. However, as Wilfrid
Hodges has observed, informal mathematical arguments include not only the “object
sentences”, in which some mathematical content is explicitly given, and “stated
or implied justifications for putting the object sentences in the places where they
appear” but also “instructions to do certain things which are needed for the proof”
[39, p. 6]. The last of these, carrying out actions, has perhaps received least attention
from logicians, but it is ubiquitous and important. Many proofs instruct us to
“ ‘Suppose C’, ‘Draw the following picture, and consider the circles D and E’, ‘Define
F as follows’ ” and so forth [39, p. 6]. Language of this sort is phrased conventionally
as an instruction to the reader, but it is also a description of the actions undertaken
by the deviser of the proof. But how did the proof’s author know which actions to
carry out? At least in some cases, by application of Scheme 3.
Carrying out a rule has also been the focus of a significant debate in the philos-
ophy of mathematics, inspired by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein
considers the case of a pupil who learns to follow a rule whereby he writes down
a series of natural numbers each greater than its predecessor by 2. However, after
he gets to 1000 he increments the numbers by 4, instead of 2, but takes himself
still to be following the same rule [76, §185]. What ought we to make of such be-
haviour? It has been suggested that Wittgenstein’s intent was to suggest a general
scepticism about rule-following [45]. If that were to be the case, Critical Question
2 in Scheme 3 would always receive an a rmative answer: there would always be
another rule which might override any rule we may consider. Less radically, we
could read Wittgenstein as counselling against a platonist interpretation of rules as
existing independently of the practices they govern [77, p. 91]. Rather we should
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understand rules as implicit within our practice but nonetheless as carrying norma-
tive force. The ontological status of rules is the subject of a di cult and important
debate. Fortunately, Scheme 3, and related rule-establishing and applying schemes,
are neutral as to the outcome of that debate.
2.2 Practical reasoning
Practical reasoning is an inevitable component of resource-sensitive mathematical
deliberation dialogues whether limited by time, money, or processor capacity. If
numerical approximation methods are easy and cheap and an exact answer would
be expensive and slow, we may settle for the former. More broadly, a dialogue can
shift to addressing this sort of question within reasoning about a problem whenever
a choice of methods arises. So practical reasoning is not just a project management
phase to be completed before the real work begins, but potentially a recurrent phe-
nomenon throughout the research process. For example, James Franklin points out
one context in which practical reasoning occurs in the career of almost every re-
search mathematician: choice of Ph.D. topic. A Ph.D. thesis is expected to address
an open question which must also be “tractable, that is, probably solvable, or at
least partially solvable, by three years’ work at the Ph.D. level” [30, p. 2]. Determin-
ing whether a problem is tractable is not something which can be established with
certainty. But it is critical to the success of the Ph.D. Elsewhere I have addressed
some special cases of practical reasoning, including argument from positive conse-
quences: if important results would follow from a conjecture, that at least provides
good reason to investigate it more thoroughly than similar, but less consequential
conjectures [5, pp. 235 f.]. However, I have not directly discussed the most general
practical reasoning scheme in Walton’s taxonomy (see also [69, p. 131]):
Argumentation Scheme 4 (Practical Inference [75, p. 323])
Major Premise: I have a goal G.
Minor Premise: Carrying out this action A is a means to realise G.
Conclusion: Therefore, I ought (practically speaking) to carry out this action A.
Critical Questions:
1. What other goals that I have that might conflict with G should be considered?
2. What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about
G should be considered?




4. What grounds are there for arguing it is practically possible for me to bring
about A?
5. What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken into account?
Scheme 4 could be used to analyse much of the embedded negotiations about
resource allocation discussed above. However, it can also play a more direct role
in mathematical reasoning: Yacin Hamami and Rebecca Morris have proposed an
account of plans and planning in proving in terms of intentions and practical rea-
soning, building on Michael Bratman’s work in the philosophy of action [16]. The
process of finding a proof, at least if the proof is of any complexity, may involve the
construction and execution of a carefully devised proof plan, which Hamami and
Morris define as “an ordered tree whose nodes are proving intentions, whose root
is the proving intention corresponding to the theorem at hand, and where each set
of ordered children consists of a subplan obtained from the parent node through an
instance of practical reasoning” [31]. The plan is not the proof, any more than the
map is the journey. But, they suggest, the plan is essential not only to successfully
finding the proof, but also to subsequently understanding the proof.
2.3 Source-dependent arguments
Mathematicians have an ambivalent attitude to authority: there is “a schism in the
mathematical community . . . [between those] who think that one should never use
a result without having understood its entire proof . . . [and those who] don’t share
that view” (anonymous mathematician, interviewed in [11]). Unlike the empirical
sciences, where replication of experiments can require substantial resources, it is in
principle always possible for mathematicians to work through every step of every
proof they use. But, for many mathematicians, a division of labour is unavoidable
and even welcome. Hence there is a place in mathematics for one of the most dis-
cussed argumentation schemes, that for argument from expert opinion [1, 5, 50].
Notably, there are several disputes over the role of testimony in mathematical rea-
soning that may be understood in terms of the critical questions of this scheme.
“Folk theorems” are one such troublesome case. These are results which are widely
used and accepted despite lacking a clear source in the literature. In a pioneer-
ing study drawing attention to their prevalence, the theoretical computer scientist
David Harel suggests that “popularity, anonymous authorship, and age . . . seem to
be necessary and su cient for a theorem to be folklore, [although] the ways in which
they appear and can be established are by no means clear-cut” [33, p. 379 f.]. Don
Fallis raises the concern that the citation of folk theorems may represent “univer-
sally untraversed gaps” in mathematical reasoning since “everyone is convinced that
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these theorems are provable, but no one has bothered to work through all the details
of a proof” [27, p. 62]. And, of course, everyone could be wrong. Colin Rittberg
and colleagues raise a di erent problem: the ambiguous status of folk theorems,
neither rigorously proved nor strictly open problems, presents a hazard to young
researchers [58]. Actually proving a folk theorem can be an unrewarding project,
since referees may reject such work as unoriginal—despite being unable to cite any
prior proof. A possible resolution to this and related problems lies in the work of
Kenny Easwaran, who has posited a property of “transferability” that may distin-
guish the proofs which safely support argument from expert opinion from those that
do not. Transferable proofs are those that “rely only on premises that the compe-
tent reader can be assumed to antecedently believe, and only make inferences that
the competent reader would be expected to accept on her own consideration” [24,
p. 354]. Hence folk theorems lack transferable proofs, unless there is a proof simple
enough for any competent mathematician to reconstruct. Many other proofs* would
be untransferable too, including unsurveyably long proofs, probabilistic proofs, and
proofs that rely on empirical procedures. This suggests a revision, or precisification,
of the critical questions of the expert opinion scheme.
Argument from expert opinion is not the only source-dependent argument rel-
evant to mathematics. Walton draws an important distinction between argument
from expert opinion and argument from position to know. The distinction is familiar
from legal practice, as that between expert and fact witnesses. I have suggested else-
where that argument from position to know provides a model for appeals to intuition
in mathematics [5, p. 240 f.]. In this I follow philosophers, such as Elijah Chudno ,
for whom intuition is analogous to perception [17, 18]. Reports on (reliable) per-
ceptions support cogent instances of argument from position to know, so if intuition
may be treated analogously, then the same scheme should apply. Arguments from
popular opinion and popular practice also have important applications to mathe-
matics [4, p. 283  .]. However, here I will focus on yet another source-dependent
argument:
Argumentation Scheme 5 (Ethotic Argument [75, p. 336])
Major Premise: If x is a person of good (bad) moral character, then what x says
should be accepted as more plausible (rejected as less plausible).
Minor Premise: a is a person of good (bad) moral character.
Conclusion: Therefore, what a says should be accepted as more plausible (rejected
as less plausible).
Critical Questions:
1. Is a a person of good (bad) moral character?
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2. Is character relevant in the dialogue?
3. Is the weight of presumption claimed strongly enough warranted by the evi-
dence given?
Superficially, this scheme may appear to be a poor fit for mathematical argument,
but there is empirical research that suggests the applicability of something much like
it. Matthew Inglis and Juan Pablo Mejía-Ramos gave an informal mathematical
argument for the presence of one million sevens in the decimal expansion of fi to
samples of undergraduates and research mathematicians and asked them to rate how
persuasive they found it [40]. Participants in both groups for whom the argument
was correctly attributed to the prominent mathematician Tim Gowers ranked it as
more persuasive than those for whom it was presented anonymously, significantly
so for the researchers (who were presumably more likely to have heard of Gowers).
Of course, it is not Gowers’s (doubtless exemplary) moral conduct which leads us
to trust his arguments, but rather his demonstrably high standards as a working
mathematician. As one of the research subjects in this study comments, “We are
told the argument is made by a reputable mathematician, so we implicitly assume
that he would tell us if he knew of any evidence or convincing arguments to the
contrary” [40, p. 42]. This suggests that we should localize Scheme 5 to mathematics,
replacing instances of “moral” with “mathematical”:
Argumentation Scheme 6 (Ethotic Mathematical Argument)
Major Premise: If x is a person of good (bad) mathematical character, then what
x says should be accepted as more plausible (rejected as less plausible).
Minor Premise: a is a person of good (bad) mathematical character.
Conclusion: Therefore, what a says should be accepted as more plausible (rejected
as less plausible).
Critical Questions:
1. Is a a person of good (bad) mathematical character?
2. Is mathematical character relevant in the dialogue?
3. Is the weight of presumption claimed strongly enough warranted by the evi-
dence given?
A (presumably implicit) invocation of Scheme 6 would explain Inglis and Mejía-
Ramos’s finding, but it raises other questions, most centrally: what is mathematical
character? This is a question which recent work applying virtue epistemology to
mathematical practice has sought to answer [63]. Mathematicians have also em-
ployed virtue talk to describe their activities. For example, George Pólya asserts
that the following “moral qualities” are required of a mathematician:
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• First, we should be ready to revise any one of our beliefs.
• Second, we should change a belief when there is a compelling reason
to change it.
• Third, we should not change a belief wantonly, without some good
reason [56, vol. 1, p. 8].
He goes on to expand on these points in explicitly virtue-theoretic terms, telling us
that intellectual courage is required for the first, intellectual honesty for the second,
and wise restraint for the last. The first of these is a widely discussed intellectual
virtue and the second is, at least in this context, closely related to the even more
widely discussed intellectual humility. Wise restraint is perhaps more familiar as
prudence or practical wisdom. More recent mathematicians who have discussed
character virtues relevant to their profession include Michael Harris [34] and Fran-
cis Su [61]. Of course, these mathematicians would not necessarily endorse every
application of Scheme 6. Indeed, as we saw above, some mathematicians consider it
to be a virtue to never take mathematical results on trust and insist on convincing
themselves of the proof of any result they cite. Nonetheless, many other mathemati-
cians, especially when reasoning speculatively rather than writing up proofs, rely
on a division of labour which makes essential use of the informal arguments of their
peers, and may be expected to take those arguments more seriously when they have
more reason to trust their authors.
3 Conclusion
Recent work in the philosophy of mathematical practice has drawn attention to
mathematical reasoning in contexts other than proof and challenged the traditional
conception that mathematical proof is essentially reducible to formal derivation.
This leaves a conspicuous lacuna in our understanding of how mathematics works.
Formal logic is an excellent tool for the analysis of formal derivations, but it is less
well adapted to the analysis of informal reasoning. However, the tools developed
by informal logicians such as Douglas Walton are a rich source for remedying this
deficit. In particular, as we have seen, dialogue types help to contextualize the
di erent levels of rigour that mathematical argument can exhibit and argumentation
schemes provide a valuable taxonomy of the steps that comprise such arguments.
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